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ARIOTO

(611 C.2d 525; 72 Cal.Rptr. 785. 446 P.2d 785]

[Sac. No. 7822.
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Nov. 13, 1968.]

DELTA DYNAMICS, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v.
EDWIN ARIOTO et aI., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Sales-Interpretation and Construction of Contract-As Buy
and Sell Agreement.-In a manufacturer's action for breach
of a combined distributorship and sales contract involving safety locks for firearms, the trial court correctly found that defendant distributors' promise to sell a specified number of
locks to third parties implied a promise to buy that number
from plaintiff, where the distributors had agreed to buy the
locks from plaintiff, the only source of supply.
[2a.2b] Id.-Actions-Extrinsic Evidence to Aid. Vary, or Explain
Oontract.-In a manufacturer's action for breach of a combined distributorship and sales contract involving safety locks
for tiI'earms, the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding extr~sic evidence offered by defendant distributors to
prove that the meaning of the termination clause of the contract was to make plaintiff's right to terminate the contract
its exclusive remedy for defendant distributors' failure to meet
an annual sales quota, where the parties might have included
the tennination clause to spell out with specificity the condition on which plaintiff manufacturer would be excused from
further performance under the contract, or to set forth the
. '~"'- exclusive remedy for a failure to meet the quota in any year,
'\. or for both such purposes, where the clause was reasonably susceptible of meaning that it expressed the parties' determination that plaintiff's sole remedy for defendants' failure to meet
a quota was to terminate the contract, and where there was
nothing in the rest of the contract to preclude that interpretation.
[3] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Evidence in Aid of Interpretation-Evidence of Meaning of Instrument.-The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be
plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered eyidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of
the inRtrument is reaRonably susceptible.
[4] Id.-Extrinsic Evidence-Evidence in Aid of InterpretationIntention of Parlies.-In construing a contract, the court must
consider all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of

[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 275 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence,
§ 1069.
McX. Dig. References: [1] Sales, § 26; [2] Sales, § 212; [3] Evidence, § 397; [4] Evidence, § 399; [5] Sales, § 305.
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the parties to determine whether offered evidence is relevant
to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is
reasonably susceptible; and if the court decides, after considering such evidence, that the language of a contract, in the light
of all the circumstances, is fairly susceptible of either one of
the two interpretations contended for, extrinsic evidence to
prove either of such meanings is admissible.
[5] Sales-Seller's Remedies-Action for Damages.-Normally the
breach of the distributors' promise in a purchase and distributorship contract between a manufacturer and distributor to
buy stated quotas of a product from the manufacturer would
give rise to an action for damages, and a termination clause
in the contract should be interpreted only as a statement of the
condition on which the manufacturer could terminate the contract and not to preclude the damage action, although susceptible of such meaning, in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the
contrary..

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Joaquin County. Robert P. Sullivan, Judge. Reversed.
Action for breach of a distributorship agreement. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
Charles A. Zeller and Francis X. Vieira for Defendants
and Appellants.
Maxwell M. Freeman and Roger H. Bernhardt for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff Delta Dynamics, Inc. developed a trigger lock for use as a safety device on firearms. On
March 23, 1961, it entered into a contract with defendants,
partners doing business as the Pixey Distributing Co., for the
distribution and sale of the locks throughout the United
States. The contract was to run for five years from the date of
the first delivery of the locks, and Pixey was given an option
to renew the contract for another five years. Delta agreed to
manufacture or arrange for the manufacture of the locks and
to supply them to Pixey, which it appointed as exclusive distributor. Pixey agreed to pay for the locks at specified prices.
Pixey promised to promote the locks diligently and "to sell
not less than 50,000 units within one year from the date of
delivery of the initial order" and not less than 100,000 units
in each of the succeeding four years. "Should Pixey fail to
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev. Sales, § 129.
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distribute in anyone year the minimum number of devices to
be distributed by it . . . this agreement shall be subject to
termination" by Delta on 30 days' notice. The contract also
provided that" In the event of breach of this agreement by
either party, the party prevailing in any action for damages
or enforcement of the terms of this Agreement shall be
entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. "
Pixey ordered and paid for 10,000 locks, and Delta delivered them in August 1961. In October 1961 Pixey executed a
written purchase order requesting Delta to supply 10,000
additional locks to be delivered "as needed." Pixey never
requested delivery of that order, however, and it did not order
any of the 30,000 additional locks needed to meet the 50,000
quota for the first year. On October 1, 1962, Delta terminated
the agreement. Thereafter it brought this action to recover
damages for Pixey's failure to purchase the first year'8
quota.
After a nonjury trial the court entered judgment for Delta.
It interpreted the contract as requiring Pixey to purchase
50,000 locks in the first year, which commenced with the initial delivery of 10,000 locks, and rejected Pixey's defense that
Delta's exclusive remedy for Pixey's failure to meet the
quota was the right to terminate the contract. Pixey appeals.
[1] We note at the outset that there is no merit in Pixey's
"-. contention that it did not agree to buy 50,000 locks from
. )Delta in the first year, but only to sell that number to third
\parties. Since Pixey agreed to buy the locks from Delta, the
only source of supply, its promise to sell 50,000 locks to third
parties clearly implied a promise to buy that number from
Delta, and the trial court correctly so found.
[2a] Pixey contends, however, that the termination clause
made Delta's right to terminate the contract Delta's exclusive
remedy for Pixey's failure to meet the annual quota and that
the trial court erred in refusing to admit extrinsic evidence
offered to prove that the termination clause had that meaning. l
IThe pretrial conference order stated that one of the issues to be
decided was whether' 'the option given . . . to the Plaintiff to terminate
the distributorship for failure to sell 50,000 locks within one year [is]
the exclusive remedy of the Plaintiff for said failure." At the trial
counsel for defendants called one of his clients and asked, "During the
negotiations that culminated in the execution of this contract between
your company and Delta Dynamics, was there any conversation or discussion as to what would happen as far as Pixey Distributing Company
is concerned if they failed to meet the minimum quota set up in that
contraet' " Plaintiff'8 counsel objected that the question ealled for parol
evidenee. Defendants' counsel answered that" The contract is ambiguous
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[3) •• The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to
explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it
appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument. is reasonably
susceptible." {4) To determine whether offered evidence is
relevant to prove such a meaning the court must consider all
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties.
"If the court decides, after considering this evidence, that the
language of a contract, in the light of all the circumstances,
•is fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations
contended for .. .' [citations], extrinsic evidence to provc
either of such meanings is admissible." (Pacific Gas & Elec.
00. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. 00. (1968) ante, pp. 33,
40 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561,442 P.2d 641].)
[2b) In ~he present case the parties may have included the
termination clause to spell out with specificity the condition
on which Delta would be excused from further performance
under the contract, or to set forth the exclusive remedy for a
failure to meet the quota in any year, or for both sllch purposes. That clause is therefore reasonably susceptible of the
meaning contended for by Pixey, namely, that it expresses the
parties' determination that Delta's sole remedy for Pixey's
failure to meet a quota was to terminate the contract. There is
nothing in the rest of the contract to preclude that interpretation. It does not render meaningless the provision for the
recovery of attorneys' fees in the event of an action for
damages for breach of the contract, for the attorneys' fees
provision would still have full effect with respect to otller
breaches of the contract. 2 Accordingly, the trial court comand we are trying to elicit from the testimony of varioDS witnesses what
the intentions of the parties were." The objection was sustained. The
offer of proof, taken alone, was too general to provide a ground for
appeal. (Stickel v. San Diego Elec. By. Co. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 157, 162·164
[195 P.2d 416]; Douillard V. Woodd (1942) 20 Cal.2d 665, 670 [128 P.2d
6]; see Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) In the context of this trial, how·
eyer, where, liS the pretrial conference order demonstrates, one of the
Ilrimary issues was whether the contract permitted recovery of damages
for the failure to meet a quota, it was obvious that counsel expected his
witness to answer that the parties intended termination to be an exclusive
remedy. Thus the SUbstance, purpose, and relevance of the offered evi·
dence was made known to the court, and no more complete offer of proof
was required. (People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 242 [187 P.2d
706] ; People v. D1UJne (1942) 21 Cal.2d 71, 81 [ISO P.2d 123]; see Evid.
Code, § 354, subd. (a).)
2For example, Pixey might llave breached the contract by failing
diligently to promote the locks or by not paying for locks that had been
deli, ered. Delta might also have breached the contract in various ways.
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mitted prejudicial error by excluding extrinsic evidence
offered to prove the meaning of the termination clause contended for by Pixey. The judgment must therefore be
reversed.
[5] Invoking Newby v. Anderson (1950) 36 Cal.2d 463
[224 P.2d 673], Pixey contends that for the guidance of the
trial court on retrial we should hold that in the absence of
extrinsic evidence offered to prove a different meaning of the
contract, termination is Delta's sole remedy for Pixey's failure to meet a quotn. In thc Newby case the national distributor of a product caned "Aquella" had appointed Newby
its western distributor. The national distributor was not satisfied with Newby's performance and transferred the distributorship to the Andersons. To effectuate the transfer, the
Andersons signed a distributorship agreement with the national distributor and a royalty agreement with Newby. The
distributorship agreement provided that" 'in order to retain
exclusive distribution "The Andersons" must purchase
.400,000 gallons of Aquella per annum' " and that" 'It is
agreed that "The Andersons" shall diligently . . . prosecute
the sale of ~quella throughout the entire territory, and do all
things reasonably necessary to establish the sale of Aquella in
all trade centers. . . .''' (Newby v. Anderson, supra, 36
Ca1.2d 463, 465.) Later the national distributor terminated
the Andersons' western distributorship because the Ander~ns did not sell the quota, and Newby brought an action
against the Andersons under the royalty agreement. We held
that the national distributor's sole remedy for the Andersons' failure to meet the quota was to terminate t11e agreement. The Andersons had only promised, however, diligently
to prosecute the sale of Aquella, and had undertaken "no
obligation to purchase the minimum quota of Aquella."
(Newby v. Anderson, supra, 36 Ca1.2d 463, 469.) Likewise,
they had undertaken no obligation to sell the minimum quota
to third parties. Under those circumstances, the purchase (If
400,000 gallons was only a condition for retaining the distributorship. That condition did not embody a promise for the
breach of which an action for damages would lie. In the
present case, however, as noted above. Pixey promised to buy
the stated quotas from Delta. Normally the breach of such a
promise would give rise to an action for damages. Although
the termination clause is reasonably susceptible of a meaning
that precludes that remedy in the absence of extrinsic evidence, we believe it should not be given that meaning but
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should be interpreted only as a statement of the condition on
which Delta could terminate the contract.
The judgment is reversed.
Peters, J. ,Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
MOSK, J.-I dissent.
Both on the basis of the four corners of the contraet and
the context in which the interrogation proceeded, the trial
court properly excluded parol evidenee.
Defendant's counsel, in direct examination of his own witness, asked: "All right now, Mr. Hoffman. During the negotiations that culminated in the execution of this contract
between your company and Delta Dynamics, was there any
conversation or discussion as to what would happen as far as
Pixey Distributing Company is concerned if they failed to
meet the minimum quota set up in that eontract Y" (Italics
added.)
An objection was made by plaintiff's counsel and sustained
by the court. Defense counsel neither made an offer of proof
nor any further effort to demonstrate there was an ambiguity
in the contract, or if there was, to offer an explanation.
On that frail record of a fleeting and demonstrably improper single question, the majority reverse a judgment to
which the trier of fact found plaintiff clearly entitled on the
weight of the evidence.
It is hornbook law that conversations, discussions and negotiations culminating in a written instrument are not admissible in evidence. Indeed, since 1872 Civil Code section 1625
(amended in 1905), has provided that the "execution of a
contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written
or not, supet'sedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution
ofthe instrument." (Italics added.)
'Vhether or not defendant's counsel intended to limit his
C}Uf'ry to negotiat.ions preceding execution of the contract, the
unalterable fact is t.hat he did so. He asked no furt.her questions and made no offer of proof. His efforts on t.his appeal,
and t.hose of the majorit.y of this eourt, to expand his inquiry
beyond the subject of negotiations are an attempt to rewrite
the record.
The majodty hold that an offer of proof was unnecessary
because the pretrial conference demonstrated" counsel expected his witness to answer that the parties intended termination
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to be an exclusive remedy." This is pure legal legerdemain,
for while tIle purpose of the pretrial proceeding is to detrrmine the issues to be tried (Van Alstyne & Grossman. California Pretrial and Settlement Supplement (Cont. Ed. Bar
1967) § 3.30), it has always bcen understood that "the parties' contentions on those issues are generally regarded as
merely tentative, nonbinding descriptions of what the parties
hope to prove" (id., § 10.14). No authority holds or has
hinted that a pretrial discussion or order is a substitute for an
offer of proof at the trial.
As stated in Ransom v. Ransom (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 258.
264 [30 Cal.Rptr. 53]: "It is a recognized rule that: 'Ordinarily when the ruling of the court sustaining an objection
indicates that counsel may not make further inquiry of a
similar nature, he must then make an offer of proof. For
example, if an objection is sustained to a question which on
its face does not indicate its materiality, counsel asking the
question must show the materiality of the question and the
expected answer. If counsel fails to make the required offer of
proof, he is precluded from urging the exclusionary ruling as
error on appeal. [Citation.] The requirement of the offer of
proof serves two practical purposes.' First, it permits thc trial
court to reconsider and correct an erroneous exclusionary
ruling in the light of all the facts. Second, it permits thc
appellate court to determine if the ruling was erroneous and,
if so, whether it was sufficiently prejudicial to justify a
reversal of the judgment.' (California Civil Procedure During Trial (Cont.Ed. Bar 1960) § 13.26.) "
Not only did counsel fail to make an offer of proof, his
query was obviously faulty. As Justice Gargano wrote for a
unanimous Court of Appeal in this case (65 Cal.Rptr. 61G,
622), "[I]t is evident from counsel's question that he was not
attempting to lay a foundation to show a latent ambiguity,
nor was he attempting to prove that the words used in the
contract were used in some special or technical sense. To the
contrary, counsel's question was seemingly an attempt to
change, vary or add to the terms of the agreement. Hence thc
trial court properly sustained the objection. "
Once again this court adopts a course leading toward emasculation of the parol evidence rule. During this very yf'at·
Masterson v. Sine (1968) 68 Cal.2d 222 [65 Cal.Rptr. 545,
436 P.2d 561], and Pacific Gas &; Elec. Co. v. O. W. ThomaR
Drayage etc. Co. (1968) ante, p. 33 [69 Cal.Rptr.
561, 442 P.2d 641], have contributed toward that result. AI-
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though I had misgivings at the time, I must confess to joining
the majority in both of those cases. Now, however, that the
majority deem negotiations leading to execution of contracts
admissible, the trend has become so unmistakably ominous
that I must urge a halt.
It can be contended that there may be no evil per se in
considering testimony about every discussion and conversation
prior to and contemporaneous with the signing of a written
instrument and that social utility may result in some circumstances. The problem, however, is that which devolves upon
members of the bar who are commissioned by clients to prepare a written instrument able to withstand future assaults.
Given two experienced businessmen dealing at arm's length,
both represented by competent counsel, it has become virtually impossible under recently evolving rules of evidence to
draft a written contract that will produce predictable results
in court. The written word, heretofore deemed immutable, is
now at all times subject to alteration by self-serving recitals
based upon fading memories of antecedent events. This, I submit, is a serious impediment to the certainty required in
commercial transactions.
I would affirm the judgment.
McComb, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December
11, 1968. McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were. of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

